April 2008
1. Introduction |
This toolbox is the output from a CIRIA collaborative study project during 2006/7 in which a team of people (see Appendix A) with first-hand knowledge of the issues involved worked as a team to deepen their personal understanding and to agree as a team what would enable improved performance on projects.
As part of this work the CIRIA team investigated defects on current projects undertaken by their organisations and discussed their findings as a team. They also contributed their personal and corporate experience. The resulting knowledge has been assembled into this toolkit, which is offered to the construction industry for use and reference. Information is also provided showing how the organisations of the participants are seeking to improve.
2. Context |
A. The problem. The main problem is that clients experience unfinished construction at handover. Late identification and rectification of defects left at handover acts as a dampener on many otherwise successful projects; defects are not the only indicator of success but they can spoil an otherwise successful project. Things are not finished properly or they do not work as hoped. Sometimes the problems are resolved to some degree but recur and cause more problems. These types of experiences apply from the most humble jobs up to prestige developments. They lead to disappointment, arguments, disruption, waste of money, energy, time and loss of reputation – and sometimes to litigation.
There is a secondary problem; the waste, cost and disruption which arise from defects during the construction process. This has traditionally been accepted as 'normal' – problems are experienced and overcome. In fact, studies have shown that cost alone is a significant issue, and the delays and disruption flowing from defects during construction can impact upon successful completion and handover.
One thing in particular was common amongst the team; we agreed that an efficient modern industry can achieve high levels of customer satisfaction only when defects have been driven out of the process, so that they are an aberration and not an accepted part of the delivery system. The benefits of reducing defects to a zero level would be to lift our performance to a higher plane should benefit all parties.
The aim of the project was to discuss how we can improve this situation.
B. Earlier UK work. An earlier study (reported in 1998) sponsored by DETR and involving 20 participants at a series of workshops, had reported that critical factors to be addressed were:
C. Changing industry environment since the DETR report. Both the Latham and Egan initiatives sought to improve the performance of the construction industry; whilst there was passing reference to the defects issue, there was no focused advice; there was however an expressed awareness that the industry needed to perform better and particularly (Latham) as a team and (Egan) in a more structured manner. The messages from these reports are echoed in this toolkit.
D. International perspective. This project was not able to examine international construction practice – and we were aware of little of relevance relating to the construction industry which was being done elsewhere. However, there was one reference to the issue of quality in Japan: the Reading Construction Forum report 'Seven pillars of partnering' states that: 'Japan is the most efficient construction industry in the world. 'Zero defects' is a reality for many major customers'.
The toolbox was launched at an event held by the CPN (CIRIA's process and technology network) in London on 7 April 2008. At the launch, three of the group spoke about their personal experiences and there was also open discussion with the delegates to the event. A workshop report from the launch is available on the CPN website.
3. What the CIRIA team did |
The CIRIA team worked through a series of four workshops, building on the earlier work.
At the first workshop we looked at the current situation and discussed the earlier work. We noted that actions from the DETR study referred to above which were awarded a high level of priority were as follows:
The conclusions of the DETR study were focused upon the ‘big picture’. The CIRIA team initially focused upon the defects themselves. Numbers and categories of defects were identified and the reasons for them explored. Further information on the work carried out by the team at this first workshop is provided in Appendix D.
At subsequent workshops we considered what we had learnt within our own organisations; information about some of the initiatives underway is provided through Appendix D. The team explored the reasons for lack of defects on projects which they had been involved in and identified the success factors and they analysed live projects to understand better how defects arose and their management and consequences. We also had a session devoted to the important issues related to the work of specialist contractors and in particular M+E. From all this work we agreed messages for industry (see Section 5) and for participants in construction projects (see Section 6).
We also looked at the underlying ‘core’ issues which must be at the heart of all defects, as presented in Appendix D. This work could be developed and taken further by future studies.
None of our suggested issues and what to do about them are presented as tablets of stone to be digested by others. Rather, we found the subject complex and our approaches to it quite diverse, so that the thoughts presented are meant to be used to promote thought and activity to suit the many diverse situations within which we in our industry operate.
4. What are ‘defects’? |
The construction industry uses various relevant terms. The prime concern is the situation at handover to the client, 'Practical Completion' (PC). During the period of activity on site leading up to handover, 'Snagging Lists' (also known as 'punch lists') are prepared to deal with all outstanding issues – but they are usually focused upon defective and incomplete work. It appears to be accepted that there will be some defects to resolve after PC because there is then a 'Defects Period' during which defects are dealt with, leading to 'Final Completion' (FC), normally after a year.
The definition of what is 'defective' can be contentious because of different expectations and perspectives. For example, where finishes are concerned – the preparation of samples of work (panels etc) which are agreed (at an early stage) to be acceptable has been found to be a good solution. Where specific tests have to be passed (e.g. roughness for a floor surface) the sample floor area would need to be tested and shown to have the required characteristics.
The treatment in contract of the remedying of defects after PC is normally loose. Resolving the issues of timing, access, secondary damage etc is often tedious and costly in terms of both money and relationships. These costs are however visible; costs during the construction process are generally hidden.
The industry manages the effects of a wide range of problems throughout the construction process and (after handover) throughout the life of a structure. Most of the defects during construction are dealt with as transitory problems – but they may well disrupt the work (particularly the programme) and plant the seeds of future problems due to ‘bodge-ups’ and problems which are only partially or superficially resolved, so that they recur later. The costs have to be absorbed within profit margins or feed through into higher out-turn prices, leading to less overall value-for-money for clients.
This study therefore examined defects as a continuum. The range of things which could go wrong was agreed to be far too extensive for detailed listing, but there was some issues and factors affecting them which were seen as being common and worth capturing – these are set out in Appendices B and C.
As far as a client is concerned, a defect could be defined as: 'An occurrence or malfunction which affects the performance or amenity of part of the built structure either directly or indirectly at some time during its design life when judged against the project brief, specification and cost plan'.
For the purposes of defects at handover a simpler definition is preferred: 'any item of work, workmanship, plant or design which is either incomplete when offered for inspection, not in compliance with the drawings and/or specification, benchmarks or samples, damaged or of indeterminate quality (including the absence of certification or records)'. In this respect, handover may be to the client or to a managing contractor.
For the consideration of waste and delay/disruption during construction, i.e. defects in the build process, a definition could be: 'any item of work, workmanship, plant or design which causes additional (unplanned) work to be carried'.
In striving for Zero Defects, whilst the prime aim is 'No defects at handover', ideally there would be no defects at any time. In business management terms, trying to reduce waste and its costs, this latter (wider) aim is worth consideration and fits with the 'lean thinking' concept. Hence, in a whole-life sense, a definition could be: 'an adverse occurrence or malfunction which affects the project during construction, at handover or during its life'. This might include for example piles being out-of-position causing a re-design of the foundations or the thermal performance of a building not meeting expectations and increasing fuel lifetime consumption.
5. Toolkit of signposting for the industry |
The project participants identified a wide range of issues which affect defects and agreed (from their experiences) the approach which would drive them down. The key issues were as follows:
Setting and meeting expectations. We agreed with the DTI study that understanding the quality levels required by clients is important. The requirements may not be well expressed in standard specifications, such that what is acceptable to one client may not be acceptable to another. An example would be acceptance (or not) of some cracking in plasterwork (cracking of plaster over a brittle base being almost inevitable).
The understanding must be communicated to those doing the work. Ideally, an understanding of what is required will be laid down in a manner which can be referred to by all parties and can be trickled down from client to designers, main contractors and specialist trade contractors. There therefore needs to be a consensus of understanding on quality issues between all parties. For complex projects, the project requires a statement of requirements with evidence against which performance can be judged by the client and/or their representatives.
Specific quality standards should be set through documentation and/or (in practice more effectively) through samples, mock-ups and trial work. What will be required at handover needs to be clearly understood from an early stage of a project, including documentation required for acceptance.
The procurement process. We all agreed that the contractual environment in which people operate is crucial. Excessive price competition and failure to value and foster long-term relationships are recipes for disaster because the industry is well versed in cutting corners once a loss is projected. In other words, 'you get what you pay for'.
Working in teams. It was agreed that a co-located design and construction team will be better placed to deliver; lines of communication are shorter, urgent issues can be dealt with fast and pride in the product should be shared
Design. Design was agreed to be important in terms of the risk of having difficult issues which took time and money to resolve. Design management and coordination is crucial, especially management of interfaces, continuing through to the incorporation of specialist contractor design. Acceptance of delayed inputs to design work is fed by a lack of definition of what is required and when, and this lead to a situation where work has to be carried out in a hurried manner, at the last minute.
The accepted design culture is one of accepting late information, leading to bunching of work, 'muddling through' and the inevitable lack of QA and 'slip-ups'.
In addition, input from future operators/users and from those who will be responsible for future maintenance , as well as from specialists, could avoid problems later; this is referred to as 'design for operation'.
Site responsibilities. Success in establishing a site team which cares about quality is crucial; this requires the right mix of skills and some training may be required. One person should be responsible overall for management of the site processes for quality/defects, getting others involved and monitoring and reporting on their performance.
Specialist subcontractors should be appointed early so that there is time
for them to be inducted into site processes and project expectations before
the physical work starts.
Avoidance measures against damage to completed work can be taken through proper
arrangements for safe access, protection of completed work, safe storage of
material and good traffic management – all of which will contribute
to a better outcome
Site quality systems. Paperwork per se is not the answer – what matters is having an approach which makes sense, is understood and respected – and which works. Key aspects were:
Programme. The need to perform to a 'tight' programme is potentially critical for defects because most teams are inexperienced in fast delivery and will 'carry on as normal'.
Programmes should be developed in consultation with specialist subcontractors (e.g. at a collaborative team planning workshop); they should include for commissioning, a defects sweep-up period and available float – all of which should ensure completion on time and with defects rectified before handover, provided that the float is 'defended' and not used indiscriminately.
One underlying issue which was raised by the specialist building services contractor we consulted was the difficulty of planning anything (but particularly the allocation of people) when the supply of project work is indeterminate, with start-times even for known work being subject to last-minute change.
Risk management. Many site problems can be identified and dealt with before they cause difficulties, if there is a project risk log owned by all the parties. Defect management, identification and correction risks should be included in the log
Technology. Adopting new materials and product technology in the build contains inherent risks. Tried-and-tested solutions are (obviously) lower risk and less likely to lead to defects. This has to be recognised and managed; cutting-edge designs may warrant a new approach in which defects are actively sought by beta-testing at an early stage in the build.
Similarly, systems such as mechanical services are increasingly complex and this must be recognised and managed; the skill of systems integration was recognised as essential for such systems i.e. how M+E fits into a building’s architecture.
Managing change. Untimely change is the enemy of good order and quality on site. Late changes should normally be resisted and if imposed should be allowed for in terms of management time, programme impact (often unforeseeable) and cost impact (likewise).
Retro-fitting and correction. The traditional method of post-handover working was agreed to be expensive and uncertain, for many reasons.
PR and client handling. Defect-handling post-handover can have a huge impact on clients and affect their likelihood of re-employing companies. For doing rectification work, a special team may be the best approach for contractors. Demonstrating to a client that his problems will be dealt with fast is an effective way to regain confidence.
Feedback. It was agreed that feedback processes are often poor; the industry constantly reinvents the wheel. This cycle of re-learning may be broken if we move to sustainable procurement with stable teams and if there is more use of pre-fabrication involving a more stable workforce situation. Lessons should be learnt not only by the team involved but also by others in the organisation, including those bidding for and planning future projects.
6. Toolkit of messages for participants in the building process |
The messages shown have been agreed by the CIRIA team. Some people or organisations may play more than one role on a project and all will be part of ‘the project team’.
Informed (repeat) clients and client representatives (such as major companies, utility companies, local authorities, project managers etc).
Casual (one-off) clients (such as smaller companies).
Constructors – business team (such as managers, estimators, planners etc).
Constructors – site team (such as site agents and their staff).
Specialist package contractors.
Design managers and coordinators (those who manage and coordinate the work of various designers).
7. Conclusions |
A. The problem of ‘defects’. The issues
of ‘defects’ is (like the construction process as currently practiced
in the UK) complex and not susceptible to resolution by complying with a brief
set of rules. Nevertheless, this project has been able to deliver guidance
on both the nature of defects and how to deal with them and also pointed out
influencing factors which should reduce their occurrence and impact.
Action by all parties is required to improve the situation. A Keisen approach
is required.
B. A cultural problem, rooted in procurement methods. Few would argue with the idea that the underlying issue is one of culture, but intertwined with that has to be the procurement and delivery environment and mechanisms which affect what people are motivated and able to do and how they therefore interact.
Based on experience, the project has offered guidance on what works best.
C. A people problem. Finally, the team were all agreed that for a successful project the first choice would be to work with people you know and trust. Anyone laying down rules for procurement whether by government or a private organisation) would do well to contemplate on that.
People issues (including their motivation, expectations and skills) underlie the solutions to the problem of defects.
John Caves, TfL (LUL) The team consulted with Dave Hewitt of MJN Colston on issues relating to building services package supply chain issues. More information about the activity of the organisations of team-members is provided in Appendix D. |
The members of the team created this list at their first workshop and it stood up well over time. Some used it in analysing projects, to categorise defects and to look for patterns on their projects. The high-level features identified were:
Within each high-level feature were a number of issues. The large number of issues to be controlled provides an insight into the magnitude of the subject.
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John Caves, TfL (LUL) Peter Clarkson, Skanska Geoff Cross, David McLean Holdings: Managing the delivery of projects with zero defects using the DMCL self-certification process Frances Gard, Kier Western: Target Zero’ defect management Peter Moore, BAA James Pargeter, Drivers Jonas Bob Peake, Metronet Colin Ratcliffe, Morgan Ashurst: ‘Perfect Delivery’ David Sturgeon, LloydsTSB John Tygier, Sheppard Robson |
If you have any feedback about the Towards Zero Defects (TZD) Toolkit, email Alan Gilbertson